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The Extent and Impact of Outsourcing:
Evidence from Germany
Craig Aubuchon, Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, and Sumon Kumar Bhaumik
The authors use data from several sources, including plant-level data from the manufacturing sector in
Germany, to expand the literature on outsourcing. They find that, in Germany, the extent of outsourcing
among manufacturing industries is higher than among service industries and that the outsourcing
intensity of these industries did not change much between 1995 and 2005. They also find a statistically
significantly positive impact of industry-level outsourcing intensity on German plant-level labor produc-
tivity for both 2000 and 2005. The estimated economic impact of outsourcing on plant-level productivity
is also fairly significant. (JEL F16, D24)
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T his paper incorporates plant-level data from the manufacturing sector in Germany toexpand the literature on the impact of outsourcing on firm-level productivity. The 2009Capgemini Executive Outsourcing Survey (Wilmot, 2009) indicates that nearly three-
fourths of the (surveyed) executives believe that outsourcing enables firms to survive in today’s
global economy. They argue that outsourcing makes firms agile and flexible (60 percent),
thereby making them better capable of facing competition, and that the money saved from
outsourcing can facilitate growth (70 percent). However, in an era of high unemployment,
criticism of outsourcing in the developed world is on the rise; and such criticism has found
some support from academic research. Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) demonstrated that out-
sourcing increases both unemployment and the labor income risk of unskilled workers in the
home country. In addition, Zhang (2011) argued that even if outsourcing increases employment
in the aggregate, it may cause net welfare loss through resource misallocation. Such findings
have resulted in a wide range of propositions to reduce outsourcing, either by disincentivizing
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it by using an appropriate tax policy or by directly imposing a cap on the proportion of jobs
that can be sent abroad to offshore firms.
The economic and political concerns about unemployment and income fragility must be
balanced against the need to ensure productivity growth. The deep post-2008 financial and eco-
nomic crisis may have permanently reduced the production capacity of industrialized countries
by as much as 4 percent (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2009, and
Furceri and Mourougane, 2009), such that a rapid rise in productivity growth might be the only
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Table 1
Review of Literature on Impact of Outsourcing
Author Country (year) Industry Impact of outsourcing on performance
Amiti and Wei U.S. Manufacturing Both servicing and materials outsourcing had a significant 
(2006) (1992-2000) impact on productivity growth in the U.S., but the impact of 
servicing outsourcing was much greater than the impact of 
materials outsourcing and accounted for 10 percent of the 
growth in labor productivity.
Bachmann and Germany Manufacturing and Overall, outsourcing increases job stability, much more so 
Braun (2011) (1991-2000) services sectors in the services sector than in the manufacturing sector. 
However, the impact of outsourcing varies by skill level of 
workers, with medium-skilled and older workers at higher 
risk of transitioning to non-employment.
Criscuolo and U.K. Manufacturing and Firms that outsource are larger and more capital intensive, 
Leaver (2005) (2000-03) services sectors are bigger users of information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) capital, and have more international links than 
firms that do not outsource. The impact of outsourcing on 
productivity is positive but not large; a 10 percent increase in 
outsourcing increases total factor productivity by 0.37 per-
cent. The effect of offshoring is caused largely by firms that 
are domestic and not engaged globally.
Daveri and Italy Selected Offshoring within the same industry is beneficial for produc-
Jona-Lasinio (1995-2003) manufacturing tivity growth, but there is no observable benefit from off-
(2008) shoring of services. The positive effect of offshoring on 
productivity is not robust to the choice of outsourcing meas-
ure; it disappears when the FH measure (described in Table 2)
is used instead of the input-output-based measure.
Egger and EU12 Manufacturing International outsourcing has a negative marginal impact on 
Egger (2006) (1993-97) value added per low-skilled worker in the short run but a 
positive marginal impact in the longer run.
Girma and Görg United Kingdom Selected Outsourcing may be driven by the objective to reduce cost, 
(2004) (1980-92) manufacturing and foreign firms are more likely to outsource than domestic 
firms. Outsourcing is associated with growth of both labor 
productivity and total factor productivity at the firm level, but
foreign firms are more likely to benefit than domestic firms.
Görg and Hanley Republic of Ireland Electronics Outsourcing can improve profitability of firms that are sub-
(2004) (1990-95) stantially larger than the average firm size, but there is no 
evidence of benefit for significantly smaller firms.
Görg and Hanley Republic of Ireland Electronics Outsourcing of materials can generate significant productivity 
(2005) (1990-95) gains, but such gains only accrue to firms with low export 
intensity. 
way to ensure that income levels in these economies recover to a pre-crisis level in the foreseeable
future (Bhaumik, 2011). At its heart, outsourcing involves firms specializing in activities in which
they have core competence (or comparative advantage) and interfirm trade in goods and services
made possible by the unbundling of the production process.1 Hence, economic theory suggests
that it should have a positive impact on firm-level productivity.2
However, the evidence in the recent literature measuring the impact of outsourcing on pro-
ductivity is somewhat mixed (Olsen, 2006). For example, Girma and Görg (2004) find that out-
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Table 1, cont’d
Review of Literature on Impact of Outsourcing
Author Country (year) Industry Impact of outsourcing on performance
Görg, Hanley, and Republic of Ireland Manufacturing International services outsourcing has a significant positive 
Strobl (2008) (1990-98) effect on productivity, but (both domestic and foreign- 
owned) exporters are likely to gain, with no evidence of 
productivity gain for non-exporters.
Gorzig and Germany Manufacturing Both materials and services outsourcing have a positive 
Stephan (2002) (1992-2000) impact on return per employee. However, the impact on 
profitability is asymmetric; materials outsourcing has a posi-
tive impact on profitability, while services outsourcing has a 
negative impact.
Hijzen, Inui, and Japan Manufacturing Outsourcing to foreign affiliates increases a firm’s productivity,
Todo (2010) (1994-2000) but outsourcing to unaffiliated foreign firms does not have 
such an effect. Indeed, outsourcing to unaffiliated foreign 
affiliates has a negative impact on firms that are not multi-
nationals and those that do not export, even though the 
impact on multinationals and exporting firms is non-negative.
Kurz (2006) U.S. Manufacturing Outsourcing firms are larger, more capital intensive, and 
(1987-96) more productive. Outsourcing itself has a positive impact on 
firm productivity but not on plant-level productivity.
Moser, Urban, and Germany All sectors Offshoring can reduce employment if it leads to downsizing 
Weder di Mauro (1998-2004) (manufacturing of firms. But the lower cost and greater competitiveness on 
(2009) treated separately) account of offshoring can lead to firm growth. Overall, 
increase in the foreign intermediate input share in total 
inputs has a significant positive impact on employment.
Olsen (2006) Meta-analysis As such, there is no clear pattern as to how offshore out-
sourcing affects productivity, and the likelihood or extent of 
gains depends on firm-level and industry-level characteristics.
There is some evidence to suggest, however, that firms are 
more likely to benefit from outsourcing if they are already 
globally engaged.
Tomiura (2007) Japan Manufacturing Firms with richer human skills or experience with FDI are 
(1998) more likely to outsource. Further, firms are more likely to off-
shore their activities if they are more productive and if their 
products are labor intensive. 
Wagner (2011) Germany Manufacturing Firms that offshore are larger, more productive, and more 
(2001-03) export-oriented than their non-offshoring counterparts; i.e., 
better firms self-select to offshore. There is no evidence of 
causal effect of offshoring on employment.
sourcing in the United Kingdom, which was at least in part a cost-reducing strategy, raised pro-
ductivity for some domestic manufacturing industries, especially for exporters. The greater
impact of outsourcing on the productivity of exporters is also confirmed for the United States
by Kurz (2006), for Ireland by Görg, Hanley, and Strobl (2008), and for Germany by Wagner
(2011). But Criscuolo and Leaver (2005) find that in the United Kingdom most of the benefits
of outsourcing accrue to firms that are not globally engaged. Similarly, Amiti and Wei (2006)
find that (service) outsourcing, which does not contribute to job losses, contributes to higher
total factor productivity (TFP). And Egger and Egger’s (2006) study of 12 European Union coun-
tries suggests that the impact of outsourcing can change over time: It can have a negative impact
on the real value added of workers in the short run, but this impact can be positive in the long
run. Table 1 summarizes the key literature results on the impact of outsourcing on employment
and firm performance.
It is not difficult to comprehend why the benefits of outsourcing may be limited. It is well
understood that firm managers have their own vested interests that have little to do with firm
performance, are boundedly rational, or can underestimate the magnitude of the cost of manag-
ing the outsourcing process and the contract with the vendors relative to benefits (on account
of hubris). Hence, the realized net benefits of outsourcing may be significantly lower than the
expected net benefits. Barthélemy (2001), for example, estimates that the cost of monitoring
information technology vendors and the cost of bargaining and renegotiating contracts with
them can be as high as 8 percent of the annual contract amount. Furthermore, it is difficult to
estimate the costs of switching from in-house information technology activities to an external
vendor and switching from one vendor to another. The actual cost of managing the overall out-
sourcing process can, therefore, be considerably higher. The marginal impact of outsourcing on
firm performance might, therefore, be insignificant.
As mentioned earlier, we extend the literature on the impact of outsourcing on firm-level
productivity using plant-level data from the German manufacturing sector. The choice of the
country is deliberate; Germany’s ability to benefit from outsourcing is not fully obvious (Farrell,
2004). We begin by examining the extent of outsourcing in German industries and the trend in
outsourcing over time. We use a number of measures for 1995, 2000, and 2005 to estimate the
extent of outsourcing in German industries over time. We compare and contrast the extent of
outsourcing  between the manufacturing and services sectors and also among the industries
within each of these sectors. Thereafter, we examine the changes in the extent of outsourcing in
these industries during the 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 periods. Next, we estimate the impact of
industry-level outsourcing intensity on plant-level labor productivity for 2000 and 2005. We find
that (i) the extent of outsourcing is higher among manufacturing industries in Germany than
among service industries and (ii) the outsourcing intensity of these industries did not change
much between 1995 and 2005. We also find a significantly positive and economically meaning-
ful impact of industry-level outsourcing intensity on plant-level labor productivity in Germany’s
manufacturing sector3 for both 2000 and 2005.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section discusses the empirical strat-
egy and the data. In particular, we highlight the extent of (and trends in) outsourcing intensity
among German industries during the 1995-2005 period. We then present the regression results
on the impact of outsourcing on labor productivity. The final section presents our conclusion.
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EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
Empirical Strategy
We model (log) labor productivity (Y/L) as a function of (log) capital per employee (K/L),
capital quality (KQ), labor skills (LS), and a number of other plant-level control variables
(included in vector Z). Finally, we add a measure of outsourcing (OSS), discussed below, to the
regression specification. Our regression mode, therefore, is as follows:
(1)
where i refers to the ith firm and ε is the i.i.d. error term. Our empirical model, which examines
the relationship between plant-level labor productivity and industry-level outsourcing intensity,
is consistent with both the strand of literature that examines plant- (or firm-) level performance
with country-level factors such as institutional quality (see Bhaumik et al., 2012, for a discussion
of the literature) and the strand that examines the impact of industry-level outsourcing on micro
variables such as individual wage rates (Geishecker and Görg, 2008).  
We include in the vector Z controls for market competition (i.e., competition) and owner-
ship (a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for foreign-owned plants), both of which can affect
firm performance (Bhaumik and Estrin, 2007). The average value of the Herfindahl index for
the 2000 sample of industries was 87, while that for the 2005 sample was 81. Foreign-owned
plants accounted for about 8 percent and 11 percent of these samples, respectively. In addition,
we control for the presence of a works council in the plant. Available evidence suggests that
works councils can facilitate efficient enforcement of contractual agreements between managers
and workers and thereby contribute to greater productivity (Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner,
2001). About 41 percent of the plants in the 2000 sample had works councils, and the correspon-
ding figure for 2005 was 46 percent. We also include in the vector a control for location (a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 when a plant is located in Eastern Germany) and distinguish
between heavy and light industries (a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for light industries).
About 30 percent of the plants in the 2000 sample and 26 percent of the plants in the 2005 sam-
ple are located in Eastern Germany.
As discussed later, we are able to use cross-sectional data for 2000 and 2005 for our estima-
tion. In keeping with the literature, we need to consider the possibility that capital per employee,
capital quality, and labor skills are endogenous. We have therefore used a two-stage instrumental
variable estimation process. In the first stage, the potentially endogenous variables have been
instrumented by past values of these variables and other exogenous variables such as firm age.
In the second stage, labor productivity (and profitability) have been regressed on the measure of
outsourcing, the instrumented values of the (potentially) endogenous variables, and the other
control variables. The first-stage regressions are reported in Appendixes A2 and A3.
Measures of Outsourcing
We generate measures of outsourcing using balance of payments and input-output tables;
details are reported in Table 2. Broadly speaking, we build on the research of Feenstra and
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Table 2
Alternative Measures of Outsourcing
Outsourcing 
measure Description
FH Following the work of Feenstra and Hanson (FH, 1996, 1999), the first measure is calculated as the share of 
imported intermediate inputs to total non-energy inputs. FH do not have a direct measure of imported inter-
mediate inputs from their data and, instead, estimate import intensity using final trade data from the IMF 
balance of payment statistics. A useful way to think about the FH measure is the sum of the input weight 
times import intensity, for all inputs into production. Thus, for each industry i, FH have
where for our measure all data come from the OECD. Imports and total production come from the total input-
output table, such that each row of the column “imports” represents the total amount of each sector that is 
imported into the country for the given year. The important distinction is that this quantity does not equal 
the column sum from the import input-output table.
FH consider only material purchases by manufacturing industries from other manufacturing industries. 
Presumably, this approach excludes input purchases from energy-intensive industries, such as ISIC code 8—
namely, coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel. By extending the analysis to all 48 ISIC industries, 
energy industries are included. For the sake of completeness, we calculate the FH measure two ways, both 
including and excluding energy input purchases in the numerator.  The results remain qualitatively the same, 
except as expected, for the two largest industries 2 (mining and quarrying) and 8 (coke, refined petroleum 
products, and nuclear fuel).
FH_narrow FH also consider a narrow measure of outsourcing intensity, which consists of input purchases of goods within
the same industry. This can be thought of as restricting input purchases to the diagonal of the input-output 
matrix. For the narrow measure of outsourcing, we do not make the distinction of energy/non-energy inputs 
in the numerator. A comparable comparison would be to simply exclude energy-intensive industries from 
consideration.
OECD Using the OECD input-output tables, we generate a direct measure of imported intermediate inputs, which is
exactly what FH and others have tried to estimate, by multiplying total intermediate inputs by an import 
intensity factor calculated from final trade data. The OECD (2008) defines offshoring as the share of non-
energy imported intermediate inputs in total non-energy intermediate inputs:
where xd
ij and xm
ij are the domestic and imported intermediate inputs from sector i to sector j, respectively, 
and i excludes the energy sectors (mining and utility). The OECD ratios are expected to be slightly lower than 
the corresponding FH measures, since the FH measures use final data for imports and production. The final 
trade data also include value added from production and, hence, might overstate the importance of a given 
import.
OECD_narrow This is the equivalent of FH’s narrow measure of outsourcing, whereby only imports from the same industry 
are taken into consideration.
FH OSS
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Hanson (1996, 1999) and define outsourcing as the share of imported intermediate inputs to
total non-energy inputs. Our measures of outsourcing are a departure from the section of the
literature that has used firm-level measures of outsourcing such as a firm-level binary indicator
of change (increase) in the proportion of intermediate goods and services that are imported
(Moser, Urban, and Weder di Mauro, 2009). The measures, however, are consistent with the
wider literature on outsourcing and its impact on firm performance. 
Table 3 shows the pairwise correlation among the different measures of outsourcing. With a
few exceptions, the correlation coefficients are large and significant at the 10 percent level. Corre -
lation is particularly high within wide and narrow measures of outsourcing. The observations
made in the rest of this paper and the results reported should therefore not be influenced signifi-
cantly by the choice of the outsourcing measure.
Figure 1 shows the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
(standard or wide) measures of outsourcing for German manufacturing and service industries
for 1995, 2000, and 2005.4 The extent of outsourcing is higher in manufacturing industries than
in service industries. For most manufacturing industries, the measure of outsourcing is between
20 percent and 40 percent, while for most service industries it is below 20 percent.5 Further, the
outsourcing intensity in both manufacturing and service industries has remained stable since
1995, suggesting that the popular wisdom that outsourcing is on the rise in developed country
industries might require further investigation.
Other Variables
Estimating the impact of industry-level outsourcing intensity on plant-level labor produc-
tivity requires plant-level data on output, employment, location, ownership, etc. To this end, we
use data provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) at Nuremberg, Germany.
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Table 2, cont’d
Alternative Measures of Outsourcing
Outsourcing 
measure Description
GG Geishecker and Görg (GG, 2008) construct a measure of outsourcing intensity by focusing on imported inter-
mediate inputs  but, in contrast to FH, normalize by total industry output value. This is an attempt to reconcile
the difference between offshoring and domestic outsourcing, since (as GG point out) an increase in domestic 
outsourcing will lower the OSS measure in the FH and OECD calculations. By including value added in the 
denominator, as part of total output, GG argue that an increase in industry-level domestic input purchases will
be countered by a decrease in industry-level value added. Hence, the GG measure of outsourcing intensity is
where Xm
ij represents the value of imported intermediate inputs from industry i to industry j and Yj represents 
the total output value of the industry of interest. Note that, in contrast to FH, GG choose to include energy 
purchases in the denominator.
GG_narrow This is the equivalent of FH’s narrow measure of outsourcing, whereby only imports from the same industry 
are taken into consideration.
GG OSS
X
Yj
m
ij
i
j
_ =
∑
,
Specifically, we use 2000 and 2005 rounds of the IAB Establishment Panel, a longitudinal survey
that currently contains data on approximately 16,000 German firms (for details, see Fischer et al.,
2008). The survey, which is the basis for a wide range of policy-related research, has two impor-
tant limitations. First, because of a change in the classification system for economic activities,
data are comparable for the 1993-99 period and thereafter for 2000 and the later years—hence
our decision to restrict our analysis of labor productivity to 2000 and 2005. Second, the data
provide information about investment flows for the years of the survey; there is no information
on capital stock. Since it is stylized to use capital stock as an explanatory variable in any regres-
sion model involving labor productivity, we had to compute plant-level capital stocks using
other data sources.
We experimented with two different approaches to computing plant-level values of capital
stock. We first used the German KLEMS data6 to compute industry-level capital-output ratios
for 1995 and used these ratios to compute approximate values of plant-level capital stock, given
data on plant-level output. We then used the data on investment flows and depreciation, and
the perpetual inventory method, to compute plant-level values of capital stock for the subse-
Aubuchon, Bandyopadhyay, Bhaumik
294 July/August  2012 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis REVIEW
Table 3
Correlations Among Alternative Measures of Outsourcing
OECD OECD_narrow GG GG_narrow FH FH_narrow
1995
OECD 1.00
OECD_narrow 0.58* 1.00
GG 0.82* 0.61* 1.00
GG_narrow 0.62* 0.95* 0.55* 1.00
FH 0.25 0.48* 0.72* 0.32* 1.00
FH_narrow 0.50* 0.89* 0.62* 0.88* 0.61* 1.00
2000
OECD 1.00
OECD_narrow 0.55* 1.00
GG 0.74* 0.80* 1.00
GG _narrow 0.70* 0.83* 0.60* 1.00
FH 0.12 0.61* 0.71* 0.15 1.00
FH_narrow 0.55* 0.86* 0.70* 0.85* 0.61* 1.00
2005
OECD 1.00
OECD_narrow 0.58* 1.00
GG 0.60* 0.66* 1.00
GG_narrow 0.72* 0.92* 0.53* 1.00
FH 0.18 0.51* 0.84* 0.28* 1.00
FH_narrow 0.61* 0.87* 0.72* 0.84* 0.64* 1.00
NOTE: Pair-wise correlations; * indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 1
OECD (standard) Measure of Outsourcing Intensity
quent years. However, the generated data had high variance, and we therefore opted for a simpler
method to compute plant-level capital stock for 2000 and 2005. Specifically, we used the industry-
level capital output ratios for 2000 and 2005, obtained from the German KLEMS data, to com-
pute plant-level capital stocks for these years, given the data on plant-level output. Detailed
information about industry classification that was necessary to match industry-level capital-
output ratios generated from KLEMS data with plant-level information was provided by IAB.
The data for industry-level measures of competition, namely, the Herfindahl index, was
provided by the German Monopolkommission. The Monopolkommission also provided infor-
mation on industry classification used for computing the Herfindahl indexes. This enabled us
to match the plant-level information to the data on industry-level competition.
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Table 4
Impact of Outsourcing on Labor Productivity
2000 2005
Outsourcing 2.69*** 2.22***
(0.08) (0.05)
Factor inputs
(Log) Capital per employee 0.97*** 0.95***
(0.005) (0.005)
Quality of capital 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.007) (0.007)
Labor skill 0.002 0.009
(0.02) (0.01)
Other controls
Market concentration –0.0004*** –0.0003***
(0.00003) (0.00002)
East German location 0.007 0.006
(0.01) (0.007)
Works council at the firm –0.0004 0.02***
(0.007) (0.007)
Foreign ownership 0.01 0.006
(0.01) (0.01)
Light industry 0.09*** 0.17***
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant –4.59*** –4.43***
(0.05) (0.05)
Anderson chi-square statistic 317.79*** 553.44***
Sargan chi-square statistic 0.21 0.11
F-statistic 5748.77*** 6713.96***
Centered R-squared 0.98 0.97
No. of observations 949 1899
NOTE: (Log) capital per employee, quality of capital, and labor skill are instrumented. Values within parentheses are robust standard errors; ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
REGRESSION RESULTS
Our regression results are reported in Table 4. We report the regression results for 2000 and
2005 alone. As mentioned earlier, on account of a change in the classification system for eco-
nomic activities, data are comparable for the 1993-99 period and thereafter for 2000 and the
later years. Further, as explained in footnote 5, we use lagged values of variables to instrument
potential endogenous variables, and absence of lagged values of appropriate variables limits our
ability to estimate a two-stage least-squares model for 1995. For 2000 and 2005, the F-statistics
suggest that the estimated models are very meaningful in the context of the data. Indeed, despite
the reduced efficiency of the regressions, on account of instrumenting, most of the explanatory
variables are significant at the 1 percent level. Further, the statistics for the Anderson test for
underidentification and the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions suggest that the choice
of instruments was appropriate.7
The results are also meaningful from the point of view of economic theory. They suggest
that labor productivity is positively related to capital per employee and capital quality. The
results indicate that the capital-per-employee elasticity of labor productivity is 0.97; that is, any
increase in capital per employee results in a proportional change in labor productivity. The
impact of capital quality on labor productivity is much weaker. Productivity is inversely related
to market concentration; that is, it is higher in competitive markets. This is consistent with the
wider literature on the impact of competition on productivity. Labor productivity is higher for
firms in the light industries than those in the heavy industries. The link between works councils
and productivity is not strong, but there is a significant positive relationship in 2005. This has
interesting implications about the debate on the impact of labor market institutions on firm
performance and is consistent with the argument that institutions that offer workers greater
protection can improve productivity (Bhaumik et al., 2012).
Most importantly, outsourcing has both a statistically significant and economically mean-
ingful impact on labor productivity. No other variable affects labor productivity as much; the
impact of outsourcing is more than 2.5 times higher than the impact of the next most important
factor, namely, capital per employee. This positive relationship between outsourcing and labor
productivity is consistent with the evidence in the wider literature. As highlighted in Table 1,
earlier research established a positive relationship between outsourcing and productivity (and
its growth) in countries such as Ireland (Görg and Hanley, 2005) and the United Kingdom
(Girma and Görg, 2004). While the overall evidence about the impact of outsourcing on pro-
ductivity remains mixed, our results strengthen the arguments that emphasize the favorable
aspects of outsourcing.
To recapitulate, our regression model has (log) labor productivity (Y/L) as the dependent
variable and a measure of outsourcing (OSS) that is bounded by zero and 1 as an explanatory
variable. The marginal impact of outsourcing on labor productivity, therefore, is given by 
for 2000 and for 2005. At the mean value for labor
productivity, therefore, the marginal impact of an increase in (industry level) outsourcing
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intensity on (plant level) labor productivity, , can be significant. This contradicts earlier
findings that the marginal impact of outsourcing intensity on firm-level labor productivity is
quite small (Criscuolo and Leaver, 2005). While it is not possible to reach strong conclusions on
the impact of outsourcing on firm-level productivity based on a single empirical investigation,
or indeed a handful of contradictory empirical results, our results suggest that there is scope for
optimism about the beneficial aspects of outsourcing.  
CONCLUSION
Outsourcing and offshoring have become increasingly volatile political issues in the devel-
oped economies of North America and Europe, in large measure on account of the rising or
high and stagnant unemployment rates in these economies. Yet, the empirical literature on the
impact of outsourcing on firms, while growing, is still somewhat small, and there is no consen-
sus in this literature about the impact of outsourcing on firm performance. We extend this liter-
ature using plant-level data from the manufacturing sector in Germany, whose ability to benefit
from outsourcing is not fully obvious. We find that the extent of outsourcing is higher among
the manufacturing industries in Germany than among the service industries and that the out-
sourcing intensity of these industries did not change much between 1995 and 2005. We also find
a significantly positive and economically meaningful impact of industry-level outsourcing inten-
sity on plant-level labor productivity, for both 2000 and 2005.
Our research has certain shortcomings. We observe outsourcing intensity at the industry
level rather than at the plant level, and we have a noisy measure of plant-level capital. However,
our analysis provides some prima facie evidence about outsourcing intensity of German indus-
tries and the outsourcing-productivity link in Germany. It therefore provides the basis for further
inquiry into the outsourcing phenomenon.
NOTES
1 The new institutional economics literature suggests that the choice between outsourcing and producing all compo-
nents of the final product internally also depends on asset specificity of the intermediate products that are out-
sourced and the corresponding governance costs of the outsourcing contracts (Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998, and
Williamson, 2002). Grossman and Helpman (2002) argue that the transactions cost approach to outsourcing is inade-
quate because it treats as given the industry environment within which a firm operates. They demonstrate that the
extent of outsourcing depends on the search costs that are incurred by the firms to find appropriate vendors, the rel-
ative bargaining powers of the firms deciding on outsourcing and the vendors supplying the (intermediate) goods
and services, and the elasticity of demand of the (final) consumer good. However, neither of these two strands of the
literature discusses the impact of outsourcing on firm performance, especially productivity.
2 The literature examines the impact of outsourcing both on firm- and plant-level productivity, and there is some indi-
cation that firm- and plant-level effects might indeed differ. We use plant-level data later in the article; however, in
the discussion, we use “firm-level” and “plant-level” interchangeably.
3 To date, the majority of the economic literature has emphasized the impact of outsourcing on manufacturing firms
(Olsen, 2006; Amiti and Wei, 2006; Görg and Hanley, 2005; Egger and Egger, 2006), but Daveri and Jona-Lasinio (2008)
considered the impact of outsourcing manufacturing and services on the Italian economy between 1995 and 2003.
They found that services outsourcing was not correlated with labor productivity but noted that their findings were
∂( )
∂
Y L
OSS
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not robust to different measures of services outsourcing. In keeping with the primary literature, and remaining cog-
nizant of the potential for measurement error with service industries highlighted by Daveri and Jona-Lasinio (2008),
we consider the impact of outsourcing on manufacturing firms.
4 The underlying figures for the manufacturing sector, which is the focus of our analysis, are reported in Appendix A1.
5 The services sector outsources a wide range of services including ICT services, administrative services, sales, and
after-sales services (through call centers, for example), etc. The U.S. financial services industry, for example, may have
outsourced as much as 15 percent of their overall cost base (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005).
6 The EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts contain industry-level data on output, inputs, and productivity for
25 European countries, Japan, and the United States. Details about the methodology used to assemble the data can
be found in O’Mahony and Timmer (2009).
7 The first stage IV regressions for the three variables, which we treat as endogenous, namely, capital per employee
(K/L), capital quality (KQ), and labor skill (LS), are reported in Appendixes A2 and A3. The first stage IV regressions
suggest that lagged values of the endogenous variables are generally the best instruments for the 2000 and 2005
values of these variables. The use of past values of variables as instruments is fairly common in the literature. We
experimented with longer lags of these variables, but the use of the shorter (one-period) lag was sufficient for our
purposes, and the use of such short lags is also desirable for the credibility of the two-stage least-squares estimates
(see Murray, 2006).
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APPENDIX A2
First Stage IV Regressions for 2000
K/L KQ LS
Firm age 0.03 0.06 0.04***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01)
Outsourcing –0.38 0.57 0.14
(0.24) (0.50) (0.13)
Market concentration 0.0001 0.00004 –0.00001
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.00005)
East German location –0.12*** –0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.06) (0.01)
Foreign ownership –0.02 –0.07 –0.03
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02)
Works council at the firm 0.11*** –0.04 0.01
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01)
Light industry 0.02 0.08 –0.01
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02)
(Lag) Capital per employee 0.90 *** 0.05* 0.02**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
(Lag) Capital quality 0.001 0.56*** 0.006
(0.01) (0.02) (0.007)
(Lag) Labor skill 0.02 –0.13 0.70***
(0.04) (0.08) (0.02)
Constant 0.88*** 1.07 –0.12
(0.16) (0.32) (0.08)
F-statistic 580.29*** 52.02*** 115.01***
Centered R-squared 0.86 0.35 0.55
NOTE: The values within parentheses are robust standard errors; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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APPENDIX A3
First Stage IV Regressions for 2005
K/L KQ LS
Firm age –0.0009 0.02 0.04***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Outsourcing –0.21* 0.03 0.03
(0.12) (0.02) (0.07)
Market concentration 0.00005 0.00001 –0.00003
(0.00006) (0.0001) (0.00003)
East German location –0.05*** 0.04 0.009
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Foreign ownership 0.04* –0.09* –0.004
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01)
Works council at the firm 0.11*** –0.06 0.003
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Light industry –0.01 –0.07 –0.02
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01)
(Lag) Capital per employee 0.88*** 0.09*** 0.007
(0.01) (0.02) (0.006)
(Lag) Capital quality 0.02* 0.55*** –0.009*
(0.0009) (0.02) (0.005)
(Lag) Labor skill 0.07*** –0.005 0.70***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
Constant 0.87*** 0.92 0.07
(0.11) (0.23) (0.06)
F-statistic 1201.19*** 88.49*** 216.90***
Centered R-squared 0.86 0.32 0.53
NOTE: The values within parentheses are robust standard errors; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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